License to sell : the effect of business registration reform on entrepreneurial activity in Mexico by Bruhn, Miriam
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4538
License to Sell:
The Effect of Business Registration Reform on 






















































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4538
This paper studies the effect of business registration 
regulation on economic activity using micro-level data. 
The identification strategy exploits the fact that a recent 
business registration reform in Mexico was introduced 
in different municipalities at different points in time. 
Using panel data from the Mexican employment 
survey, I find that the reform increased the number of 
registered businesses by 5 percent in eligible industries. 
This increase was due to former wage earners opening 
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businesses. Former unregistered business owners were 
not more likely to register their business after the reform. 
Moreover, employment in eligible industries went up by 
2.8 percent, and people who were previously unemployed 
or out of the labor force were more likely to work as 
wage earners after the reform. Finally, the results imply 
that the competition from new entrants lowered prices 
by 0.6 percent and decreased the income of incumbent 
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Business entry regulation varies widely across the world. Djankov et al (2002), ￿nd that the
number of procedures for registering a business ranged from 2 in Canada to 21 in the Dominican
Republic in 1999. Given these large di⁄erences, an important question to study is the e⁄ect
of entry regulation on economic outcomes. Most work on this question has been based on
cross-country studies1, yet such an approach su⁄ers from endogeneity issues. In particular,
cross-country studies cannot rule out that causality goes the other way, such that increases in
entry or output lead to reforms. It is also possible that both simpler regulation and higher
entry or growth are caused by a third variable. Recent work has also looked at cross-country,
cross-industry variation to try to account for endogeneity2. However, this approach cannot
quantify the overall e⁄ect of di⁄erences in entry regulation, since all estimates are relative to
a benchmark value of the ￿natural￿rates of entry within industries.
This paper uses within country micro-level data to examine the e⁄ect of entry regulation
on economic outcomes. Speci￿cally, it exploits cross-municipality and cross-time variation in a
recent business registration reform in Mexico to measure the e⁄ect of this reform on registration,
employment, and income, which allows for establishing causality more convincingly than cross-
country studies (See Pande and Udry, 2005, for a call to move to research of this type). From
a policy perspective, it is also important to study the impact of reforms, since some policy
institutions, such as the World Bank, promote simpli￿cation of business registration.
The use of micro data also makes it possible to trace out the e⁄ects of the reform on the
functioning of the product and labor markets. Many economists have argued that barriers to
entry harm consumers by raising prices and thwarting employment growth. This paper ￿rst
examines whether the reform led to the creation of new ￿rms or merely to the registration of
existing informal businesses3. Having shown that it led to the creation of new businesses, the
paper traces out the impact of this increase in competition on consumer prices, incumbents￿
income, and employment.
The paper starts by building a simple model describing the expected e⁄ects on the product
and labor markets when the cost of registration drops. In the model, high cost of registration
prevents individuals with medium range ability from opening a formal business. Therefore,
1For example, Loayza, Oviedo, and ServØn (2005) and Djankov, McLiesh, and Ramalho (2006) provide
evidence that countries with less regulation grow faster.
2Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006), as well as Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004), show that countries with
heavier entry regulation have lower ￿rm entry and lower growth in value added in naturally high-entry industries.
3Registration of existing informal businesses may still result in an increase in production and e¢ ciency even
if no new businesses are created due to the bene￿ts of formality.
1the reform leads to increased entry. Depending on the assumption about returns in the infor-
mal sector, the increase in entry comes either from informal business owners registering their
business or wage earners opening new businesses. The model also predicts that increased entry
leads to a decrease in prices and to a decline in income for incumbent businesses.
The paper then tests the predictions of the model using the Mexican reform. The identi￿-
cation strategy used to estimate the e⁄ects of the reform relies on the fact that implementation
of the business registration reform in Mexico varied across municipalities and across time. The
reform was organized by a federal agency, the COFEMER. This agency had to coordinate
with municipality governments on implementing the reform since many business registration
procedures are set locally in Mexico. COFEMER￿ s goal was to bring the reform to urban mu-
nicipalities that had the largest volume of economic activity in Mexico. However, due to sta⁄
constraints, COFEMER could not implement the reform in all the priority municipalities at
the same time. Moreover, they did not specify a particular pattern of implementation within
the set of priority municipalities. A number of checks suggest that the order of implementation
was indeed exogenous to the outcomes in this set of municipalities.
The reform reduced registration procedures from 8 on average to less than 3. To give a sense
of the magnitude of this reform, the reduction corresponds to going from the 30th percentile in
registration procedures to the 2nd percentile, or equivalently it corresponds to going from Peru
or Pakistan to New Zealand or Australia. It is important to note that only ￿rms in low-risk
to society4 and unregulated industries were eligible for the reform. These eligible industries
encompassed approximately 80 percent of pre-reform ￿rms.
The results show that the reform increased the number of registered businesses by 5 percent
in eligible industries, supporting the ￿nding of the cross-country literature that lower regulation
leads to more entry. The increase in the number of new businesses came exclusively from
former wage earners opening businesses. Informal (non-registered) business owners were not
more likely to register their business after the reform. The results also show that employment
in eligible industries increased by 2.8 percent after the reform. In particular, people who were
previously unemployed or out of the labor force were more likely to work as wage earners after
the reform.
By increasing competition, the reform bene￿tted consumers and hurt incumbent businesses.
First, using the Mexican CPI as an outcome variable, I ￿nd that the reform decreased the price
level by 0.6 percent. The fact that the price decline was concentrated among low-risk industries
in the non-tradable goods sector indicates that this was due to competition. Second, the income
of incumbent registered businesses declined by 3.2 percent. Some of the evidence also suggests
4Low-risk industries are industries that do not present a serious risk to public health, public security, or the
environment. An example of a high-risk industry is chemical production.
2that the income of previous wage earners decreased after the reform, possibly because business
owners passed on the decline in prices to their workers. Interestingly, the results do not show
an increase in income for the wage earners who opened a business. One possible explanation is
that these new entrepreneurs are still paying o⁄ the ￿xed cost of opening their business during
the period of observation. Previous wage earners are observed for a maximum of 4 quarters
after the reform. Finally, the income of the previously unemployed and out of the labor force
increased after the reform, by about 6 percent.
Overall, this paper illustrates that the e⁄ects of a business registration reform are positive
and potentially important. These ￿ndings match related within-country studies on the impact
of reforms. Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) examine what happens to employment growth in
the retail trade industry in France after the introduction of zoning regulation which restricts
the establishment of large retail stores. Exploiting regional variation in the enforcement of
this regulation, they show that stronger deterrence of entry decreased employment growth.
Moreover, the World Bank￿ s Doing Business reports include suggestive evidence on the positive
impact of business registration reforms. Doing Business in 2005 states that the top 5 reformers
in 2003 - Ethiopia, France, Morocco, Slovakia and Turkey - have experienced higher increases
in new registrations than the OECD average. Doing Business in 2006 documents that business
entry jumped up in several countries by 10 to 42 percent following a reform of registration
procedures. The ￿ndings of this paper also lend support to the recent attention that policy
institutions and governments have paid to business registration reform as a possible vehicle to
foster economic development.
Concurrently to this paper, Kaplan, Piedra, and Seira (2006) have investigated the e⁄ect of
the same business registration reform in Mexico on ￿rm creation. A key di⁄erence to my paper
is that they use registration and employment data from the Mexican Social Security Institute
(IMSS), while my paper uses household data from the Mexican Labor Market Survey. One
disadvantage of the IMSS data is that it does not capture registered ￿rms without employees
since owners do not typically register themselves with social security5. Another disadvantage
is that not all registered ￿rms with employees are in the IMSS database since a signi￿cant
fraction of owners does not register their workers with the IMSS. Consequently, the estimated
increase in the number of registered ￿rms in Kaplan, Piedra, and Seira is 7.6 times smaller
than the increase in the number of registered ￿rms estimated in this paper. Another di⁄erence
to Kaplan, Piedra, and Seira is that I am able to provide direct evidence that newly registered
￿rms are not previously existing informal ￿rms, but instead new ￿rms created by former
5According to my data, in the pre-reform period, 40 percent of registered businesses and 79 percent of
unregistered businesses had no employees. Among registered ￿rms without employees, less than 0.2 percent of
owners were also registered with IMSS.
3wage earners. Furthermore, Kaplan, Piedra, and Seira￿ s data does not include information
on income. My paper, however, identi￿es the e⁄ect of the reform on the income of di⁄erent
pre-reform occupation groups.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the business registration
reform. Section 3 develops a simple occupational choice model which provides the framework
for analyzing the e⁄ects of the registration reform. Section 4 discusses the identi￿cation strat-
egy and Section 5 describes the Mexican employment survey data. Section 6 presents the
empirical results. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Mexican Rapid Business Opening System Reform
According to Djankov et al (2002), in 1999, the number of procedures required to register a
business in Mexico was 15 and the number of days was 67. Both numbers were above the cross-
country average (10 and 48 respectively)6. Realizing that Mexico had rather heavy regulations
by international comparison, in 2000, the Mexican government created the Federal Commission
for Improving Regulation (COFEMER), charged with providing information about the state
of regulation across Mexico and implementing possible reforms.
The COFEMER suggested a reform to simplify business registration procedures with the
goal of stimulating investment and economic growth. Following this proposal, on March 1,
2002, the Mexican government passed a federal law stating that the number of federal pro-
cedures required for starting operation of most businesses should be reduced to a maximum
of two procedures that could be administered within 72 hours. These two procedures are ob-
taining a tax payer number and incorporating the business in case it is a corporation. Once a
￿rm starts operating, it has three months to take care of the other federal requirements that
may apply, such as registering workers for medical insurance. This reform applied only to
non-governmental ￿rms in industries which do not require special permits or concessions and
which do not present a serious risk to public health, public security, or the environment. These
eligible ￿low-risk￿industries made up 55 percent of all industries and 80 percent of operat-
ing ￿rms, typically micro, small or medium size businesses. Another 10 percent of industries
were governmental and 35 percent were classi￿ed as ￿high-risk￿or regulated. Appendix A lists
examples of low-risk and high-risk/regulated industries as classi￿ed by the COFEMER. Exam-
ples of low-risk industries are commerce and restaurants. Examples of high-risk or regulated
industries are chemical production and transportation (including taxis).
However, simplifying federal regulations was not enough, since there were additional state
6The minimum number of procedures (days) was 2 (2) both in Canada and Australia. The maximum number
of procedures (days) was 21 in the Dominican Republic (152 in Madagascar). These numbers refer to business
registration in the largest city of each country. For Mexico, this is Mexico City.
4and municipal procedures required for starting a business. These procedures typically varied
from state to state and municipality to municipality. Having simpli￿ed federal regulations, the
COFEMER then approached state and municipal governments to suggest that they cut down
on local regulations and that they implement one-stop-shop centers where entrepreneurs could
take care of federal, state, and municipal procedures at the same time. The COFEMER￿ s
goal was to create a Rapid Business Opening System (SARE) in Mexico￿ s most populous and
economically important urban municipalities in order to quickly reach a large number of people
and a large fraction of economic activity with the reform. However, the COFEMER was not
able to bring a SARE to all those municipalities at the same time since it had limited resources.
There were only four people within the COFEMER working on spreading the reform to local
governments. Consequently, the SARE was implemented in di⁄erent municipalities at di⁄erent
times, staring in May 2002. By September 2006, 103 municipalities had a SARE and another
13 municipalities were in the process of setting up a SARE7.
The SARE was successful in simplifying local business registration procedures. Table 1
shows summary statistics for business registration procedures before and after the reform for
a sample of 32 municipalities from 17 di⁄erent states. The averages for the number of days,
procedures and o¢ ce visits required to register a business all decreased signi￿cantly, falling
from 30.1 to 1.4, from 7.9 to 2.7 and from 4.2 to 1, respectively8. The standard deviations of
all three measures also became much smaller, implying relatively small di⁄erences in business
registration procedures across municipalities after the reform.
I have fairly detailed administrative data on licenses issued in 2004 from the registration
center in one of the municipalities which adopted the reform in 2003, Guadalajara. Looking
at these data provides an insight into what types of businesses registered after the reform.
Guadalajara reports that a total of 16,631 businesses were created in 2004, corresponding to
an investment of US$ 90,997,003 and to 21,170 new jobs created. The average investment was
thus US$ 5,471 and the average employment per ￿rm was 1.27. The most frequent business
types were video game console rental, computer rental, small grocery stores, clothing stores,
home-style food-to-go vendors, and beauty salons.
7There are 2454 counties in Mexico, but 94 percent of the population and 98 percent of economic activity
are concentrated in 450 counties. These 450 counties include 99 of the 103 counties which had a SARE by
September 2006. The SARE counties contain 33 percent of the population and 47 percent of economic activity.
The four counties which are not part of the 450 biggest counties, but have a SARE, implemented the reform
when other counties in the same state implemented it.
8These pre-reform data are di⁄erent from the data in Djankov et al since the latter are for Mexico City
only. The 32 counties for which COFEMER reports data don￿ t include any county from Mexico City since these
counties have not implemented reforms.
53 A Simple Occupational Choice Model
To have a framework for analyzing the e⁄ects of the business registration reform, I develop
a simple occupational choice model. The model generates a division of the population into
three occupational groups: wage earners, informal (non-registered) business owners and formal
(registered) business owners. An important issue is how we should model informal business
owners. There are two di⁄erent views in the literature. One view is that informal business
owners are people who can not be wage earners since their ability is too low. Therefore, they
set up a micro ￿rm in the informal sector. Under this view, the informal sector is a residual
sector (See for example Loayza, 1994). The other view says that informal business owners
have relatively high ability. However, their ability is lower than the ability of formal business
owners, and they operate in an unregulated environment since the costs of formality are high
(See Levenson and Maloney, 1998, and Maloney, 2004). The latter view is largely consistent
with Hernando de Soto￿ s view. He argues, based on anecdotal evidence, that complicated and
costly business registration procedures have caused ￿two-thirds of the world￿ s population [to
be] locked out of the global economy: forced to operate outside the rule of law, they have no
legal identity, no credit, no capital, and thus no way to prosper.￿
The model considers two alternative assumptions about returns in the informal sector,
which generate occupation divisions corresponding to each of the two views. Both assump-
tions give the same predictions about the overall e⁄ects of the business registration reform.
However, the predictions about the e⁄ects on wage earners and informal business owners are
di⁄erent across the two models. I test these predictions in Section 6. The reform thus helps
to discriminate between the two views described above.
3.1 The Environment
The economy lasts for one period and is populated by a continuum of individuals of mass one.
Individuals have strictly increasing preferences over consumption, u(c). They have one unit of
labor they can supply, and they have to choose between becoming a wage earner, setting up a
formal (registered) ￿rm, or setting up an informal (unregistered) ￿rm.
Each individual is endowed with an ability level, x, drawn from a uniform distribution
H(x) with support [0;1]. Wage earners are employed by formal ￿rms and get a wage w(x).
Each formal ￿rm employes exactly one worker. The production function for formal ￿rms,
y(x;xw), depends on the ability level of the owner, x, and the ability level of the worker, xw.
In particular, I assume
y = ￿x + xw,
6where ￿ > 1. Formal ￿rms face a downward sloping demand curve for the good they pro-
duce, such that the price of this good is a function, P(Y ), of the aggregate quantity produced,
Y , where
dP(Y )
dY < 0. Note that the assumption that prices decrease with aggregate output
should be true only for non-tradable goods, but not for tradable goods. I assume that the
price is measured in terms of a second good that all agents produce at home and that plays
no role in the labor market or in ￿rm production. The home good is thus the numeraire.
There is a ￿xed cost, F, of registering a formal ￿rm, implying that formal ￿rms￿pro￿ts are
￿(x;xw;P(Y );F) = P(Y )[￿x + xw] ￿ w(xw) ￿ F.
Since formal ￿rms are relatively small, they do not consider the impact their output has
on aggregate output and the price in their decision to produce.
Pro￿t maximization implies that
w0(xw) = P(Y ),
such that the marginal increase in wage for an additional unit of ability is equal to the price.
This implies that the wage of a worker of ability x, w(x), is of the form P(Y )x￿k, where is a
k constant that clears the labor market.
Informal business owners produce the same good as formal ￿rms, but they have a di⁄erent
production function, y = ￿x, where 0 < ￿ < ￿. The assumption that owner￿ s productivity is
higher in the formal sector is based on the argument that ￿rms in the formal sector have access
to legally enforceable agreements, to government support programs, and to new and lower cost
sources of ￿nancing (see Jansson and Chalmers, 2001). They also avoid paying government
penalties and can expand without fear of being detected. Moreover, McKenzie and Sakho
(2007) show that a major bene￿t of being formal is that it enables ￿rms to issue tax receipts
and thereby expand their customer base.
In this model, informal business owners work alone. This fact generally matches my data. In
the pre-reform period, 79 percent of informal business owners work alone, another 20 percent
have one employee and only 1 percent have more than one employee. In contrast, only 40
percent of formal business owners work alone, 50 percent have one employee and another 10
percent have more than one employee.
Agents choose their occupation by maximizing utility subject to their ability constraint.
In this economy, utility maximization is equivalent to income maximization, where the income
from the di⁄erent types of occupations, I(x;P(Y );F), is given by
7I(x;P(Y );F) =
P(Y )￿x for informal business owners,
P(Y )x ￿ k for wage earners,
P(Y )￿x + k ￿ F for formal business owners.
Depending on the size of returns in the informal sector, ￿, the resulting occupation division
matches one of the two di⁄erent views of informal businesses mentioned above. If returns in the
informal sector are low, such that ￿ < 1, then the resulting occupation division is consistent
with the residual sector view. If returns in the informal sector are high, such that 1 < ￿ < ￿,
then the resulting occupation division matches the De Soto view.
The following subsections discuss the occupation divisions and equilibria under the di⁄erent
assumptions about productivity in the informal sector.
3.2 Occupational Choice with a Low Productivity Informal Sector
If ￿ < 1, then income from wage work exceeds income from informal businesses for levels of
x higher than a cuto⁄, xw. This threshold level is de￿ned by P(Y )￿xw = P(Y )xw ￿ k, and
agents with ability lower than xw become informal business owners.
Agents with ability higher than xw have to choose between becoming wage earners and
formal business owners. Holding the price ￿xed, a ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts are strictly increasing in x,
which implies that only agents with relatively high ability, x, choose to become formal business
owners. In particular, there exists a threshold level, x, such that for values of ability above
this level pro￿ts exceed the income of wage earners. This threshold level x is de￿ned by
P(Y )￿x+k￿F = P(Y )x￿k. Given this threshold level, the occupation division is as follows
1. Agents with ability above x become formal business owners.
2. Agents with ability between x and xw become wage earners.
3. Agents with ability below xw become informal business owners.
Figure 1 depicts income and the occupation division as a function of ability under the
assumption that ￿rms in the informal sector have low productivity.
3.3 Equilibrium with a Low Productivity Informal Sector












This condition closes the model since it determines the value of the constant k that clears
the labor market.
Aggregate output is given by










Note that both labor demand and aggregate output depend on the price level and the ￿xed
cost of registration.
3.4 Occupational Choice with a High Productivity Informal Sector
If 1 < ￿ < ￿, then income from an informal business exceeds the income from wage work.
Therefore, the cuto⁄ level of ability x is now the cuto⁄ between formal business owners and
informal business owners. This cuto⁄ level, x, is de￿ned by P(Y )￿x + k ￿ F = P(Y )￿x.
Note that, under the assumption that 1 < ￿ < ￿, formal ￿rms need to share more of
their revenues with their workers than they do when ￿ < 1, such that k becomes negative in
equilibrium. Otherwise, all agents with x smaller than x would prefer to be informal business
owners since ￿x > x￿k would be true for each level of x if k were positive. The threshold level,
xw, now represents the cuto⁄ level of ability between workers and informal business owners.
This threshold level is given by P(Y )￿xw = P(Y )xw ￿ k.
The occupation division is a follows
1. Agents with ability above x become formal business owners.
2. Agents with ability between x and xw become informal business owners.
3. Agents with ability below xw become wage earners.
Figure 2 depicts income and the occupation division as a function of ability under the
assumption that ￿rms in the informal sector have high productivity.
3.5 Equilibrium with a High Productivity Informal Sector












This condition again determines the value of the constant k that clears the labor market.
Aggregate output is now given by










Both labor demand and aggregate output depend on the price level and the ￿xed cost of
registration.
3.6 Di⁄erences in Occupation Division Across Assumptions
Note that the main di⁄erences generated by the di⁄erent assumptions about productivity in
the informal sector lie in the relative income and ability levels of wage earners and informal
￿rms. Under the low productivity assumption, informal businesses earn less than wage earners
and are also of lower ability. Under the high productivity assumption, informal businesses earn
more than wage earners and are of higher ability.
To gauge which assumption ￿ts the facts better, I look at averages in log monthly income
and income residuals for di⁄erent occupation groups from my pre-reform data. Table 2 reports
these statistics for informal (non-registered) business owners, wage earners, and formal (regis-
tered) business owners. Registered business owners have the highest income on average (8.32),
followed by wage earners (8.01), and ￿nally non-registered businesses (7.52). The income resid-
uals are the residuals of a regression that includes age, education dummies, a gender dummy,
and a martial status dummy, as well as time and municipality dummies. The ranking of the
average income residuals is the same as the ranking of average income, with registered busi-
nesses having the highest income residuals, followed by wage earners, and then non-registered
businesses.
The pre-reform data thus suggest that the low productivity assumption is more appropriate,
meaning that informal business owners are low-income/low-ability individuals who are in this
occupation for the lack of better options. The data do not support the view that informal
business owners are medium-range-ability individuals who choose informal production over
wage work.
The next subsection analyzes what happens under each assumption when the cost of reg-
istration drops. I test the predictions generated by both assumptions in Section 6.
103.7 Comparative Statics
The business registration reform corresponds to a reduction in the ￿xed cost of registration,
F. This decrease in F has a number of e⁄ects in the model. These e⁄ects are depicted in
Figures 3 and 4, where F0 is the decreased level of F, such that F0 < F. The ￿rst e⁄ect under
both assumptions is that the pro￿t line for formal ￿rms shifts up, such that potential formal
￿rm pro￿ts are higher for each ability level. This means that the threshold level x moves to
the left.
As x moves to the left, there is entry into the registered business sector, which increases
aggregate output and decreases the price, P (as mentioned before, the decrease in P should
only be observed in the non-tradables sector). As a result, the pro￿t line of formal ￿rms rotates
downward, and x shifts to the right. The wage line also rotates downward, which moves x to
the left. Overall, x has to shift to the left. It is not possible for the decrease in P and the
rotation in the pro￿t line to shift x back its original value or to the right. In that case, there
would be no entry, or there would be exit, and P would not decrease in the ￿rst place. The
decrease in the price implies that incumbent formal businesses see a decline in revenues. The
income of informal businesses also declines.
As the number of formal businesses increases, labor demand increases by the same amount.
The constant k then adjusts down to give an incentive to informal business owners to become
wage earners. This decline in k further contributes to the decline in income of formal business
owners. The e⁄ect on the income of agents who remain wage earners after the reform is
ambiguous. The decrease in the price lowers their income, but the decline in k increases their
income.
To summarize, the model predicts that the registration reform should lead to
1. An increase in the fraction of registered businesses.
2. An increase in the number of wage earners and total employment in the formal sector.
3. A decrease in the price level.
4. A decrease in revenues for incumbent formal businesses and for informal businesses.
Under the low productivity assumption, the agents who open a registered business are
former wage workers. Therefore, we should observe that
1. Agents who open a registered business are previous wage earners.
2. The wage earners who switch are the ones with the highest ability.
113. Income increases for the wage earners who open a business.
Under the high productivity assumption, it is not wage earners who open registered busi-
nesses. Instead, informal business owners register their business. In that case, we should see
that
1. Some informal business owners register their businesses.
2. The informal business owners who register are the ones with the highest ability.
3. Income increases for the informal business owners who register their business.
In Section 6, when testing the prediction in the data, I present evidence on the overall
changes in the outcome variables after the reform and break down these e⁄ects by pre-reform
occupation. However, before moving on to the empirical results, I discuss the identi￿cation
strategy and the data in the following two sections.
4 Identi￿cation Strategy
This paper uses the cross-municipality and cross-time variation in the implementation of the
reform to determine its e⁄ect. The data cover all quarters from the second quarter of 2000
to the fourth quarter of 2004. I restrict my sample to the 34 municipalities that adopted the
reform by December 20049. This allows me to exploit only variation in the time of adoption,
holding the decision to adopt ￿xed for all municipalities in my sample. One reason for not
including municipalities that adopted after December 2004 or that have not yet adopted is that
these municipalities become increasingly less comparable to the ones that adopted the reform
early10. Moreover, the part of the analysis below that looks at the e⁄ects of the reform on
di⁄erent pre-reform groups requires me to observe individuals at least once before the reform
was implemented.
A list of the municipalities which implemented the reform by December 2004 with respective
implementation dates is provided in Appendix B. Figure 5 shows the geographic location of
9In fact, 38 counties adopted the reform by December 2004, but I do not have data for four of them.
10Note that Kaplan, Piedra, and Seira (2006) look at a larger set of municipalities in their analysis. Their
data set goes up to March 2006, instead of December 2004 as my data does, which allows them to see more
municipalities being treated. However, this also implies that the set of municipalities becomes less comparable.
In fact, their cross-municipality, cross-time estimates show a negative e⁄ect on ￿rm registration while their
cross-municipality, cross-time, cross-industry estimates show positive e⁄ects. They argue that this is due to
the fact that the municipalities that adopted by December 2004 were a⁄ected more strongly by an economic
slowdown that coincided with the implementation of the reform. There is, however, no direct evidence for this
claim since output data at the municipality level is only available every ￿ve years in Mexico. These potential
economic di⁄erences should not a⁄ect my analysis since all of my municipalities fall into the set of municipalities
that adopted by December 2004. Moreover, as shown in Figure 6, rather than experiencing a slowdown in 2002
when the ￿rst municipalities implemented the reform, the Mexican economy actually started to recover from an
economic downturn.
12these municipalities. The map is coded in the following way. The 17 municipalities which
adopted the reform early, between May 2002 and March 2004, are marked by circles. The
17 municipalities which adopted the reform late, between April 2004 and December 2004 are
marked by triangles. Both early and late adopters are fairly dispersed throughout Mexico.
The fact that adoption of the reform varied across municipalities and across time makes it
possible to control for municipality speci￿c and time speci￿c e⁄ects. The e⁄ect of the reform
is thus identi￿ed using cross-municipality di⁄erences in the reform dummy over time. The
identi￿cation strategy is valid as long as the changes in outcome variables over time would
be similar across municipalities in the absence of the reform. In particular, the identi￿cation
strategy may be violated if the implementation of the reform followed a speci￿c pattern in
terms of municipality characteristics that are related to changes in outcomes. For example,
if the municipalities which experienced a high increase in registered businesses adopted the
reform ￿rst, I might ￿nd an e⁄ect of the reform even if there was no e⁄ect. To gauge whether
or not there was such a speci￿c pattern of implementation, I performed a number of checks.
First, I interviewed several sta⁄ members at the COFEMER who are in charge of imple-
menting the reform. They informed me that their goal was to bring the reform ￿rst to the
urban municipalities that have the largest volume of economic activity in Mexico. However,
within this set of municipalities they did not specify a particular pattern of implementation. In
fact, they mentioned that all municipality governments they approached were very interested
in adopting the reform. As discussed in Section 2, COFEMER was not able to implement the
reform in all municipalities simultaneously since they did not have enough personnel.
Second, to check whether the 34 municipalities in my sample are indeed comparable, I
examine data from the 1994 and 1999 Economic Census. Panel A of Table 3 presents averages
for 1999 log GDP per capita, log economic establishments per 1000 capita, log ￿xed assets per
capita, and log investment per capita split-up by early and late adopters11. The comparison
of early and late adopters in Column 3 of Table 3 shows that they are no statistically signif-
icant di⁄erences in terms of the number of economic establishments per capita, ￿xed assets
per capita, and investment per capita. Log GDP per capita is higher on average for early
adopters. To further examine the pattern of implementation of the reform, I regress each of
the three Census variables on the quarter of implementation. The coe¢ cients on quarter of
implementation are reported in Column 4 of Table 3. While there is no statistically signi￿cant
trend for changes in log employment per capita and log investment per capita, log GDP per
capita and ￿xed assets per capita are higher for municipalities that adopted the reform earlier.
11The GDP, establishment, ￿xed assets, and investment data come from the 1994 and 1999 Economic Censuses.
To convert these numbers into per capita values I use population data from the 1995 Population Count and the
2000 Demographic Census.
13The fact that log GDP per capita and ￿xed assets per capita tend to be higher for munici-
palities which adopted the reform earlier does not per se invalidate the identi￿cation strategy
since the identi￿cation strategy relies on changes over time being similar across municipalities.
Thus, Table 3 also compares changes in log GDP per capita, log economic establishments per
capita, log ￿xed assets per capita, and log investment per capita from 1994 to 1999. The aver-
ages for early and late adopters are in Columns 1 and 2 in Panel B of Table 3. Columns 3 and
4 show that the changes in the Economic Census variables are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent across
early and late adopters and that they do not follow a speci￿c pattern of implementation over
time. This adds plausibility to the argument that changes of outcomes in these municipalities
would have been similar in the absence of the reform. To further support the identi￿cation
strategy, in the following section, I illustrate that there is no pattern of adoption related to
pre-reform outcome data.
Finally, in the empirical strategy, I take into account that log GDP per capita and log
￿xed assets per capita di⁄ered across early and late adopters in 1999 by controlling for 1999
Economic Census variables interacted with a linear time trend. It is not possible to control for
contemporaneous Economic Census variables or Economic Census variables closer to the year
of ￿rst implementation (2002) since the Economic Census in Mexico is only conducted every
￿ve years and there is no higher frequency data on GDP at the municipality level. To explore
Mexico￿ s economic situation at the time around the reform in more detail, Figure 6 displays
the time series of quarterly real GDP (in 1993 Mexican pesos). The time series shows that
the Mexican economy experienced a downturn between 2000 and 2002. Then, GDP started
increasing again, and it grew at higher rates from 2004 on. To account for these non-linear
patterns and for the possibility that they may di⁄er across municipalities, I re-ran the main
regressions of the paper controlling for Economic Census variables interacted with a linear
time trend and with time trends of higher powers, up to power 4. The results change only
minimally and are not reported in the paper.
5 Mexican Employment Survey Data
My main outcome data comes from the Mexican National Employment Survey (ENE). The
ENE is the survey that the Mexican government relies on for calculating unemployment statis-
tics and for calculating the size of the informal sector. It has been conducted quarterly since
2000-II and covers a random sample of approximately 150,000 households. Each household
remains in the survey for ￿ve consecutive quarters. I use data for 2000-II to 2004-IV (19 quar-
ters in total). After 2004-IV, the ENE was changed to a new survey, whose results have not
been made publicly available.
14I choose the ENE data as my outcome data since it has ￿ve important features for this study.
First, it covers almost all municipalities that implemented the reform. Second, the quarterly
frequency of the data allows me to exploit the staggered implementation of the reform in the
identi￿cation strategy. Third, the ENE includes detailed questions about a person￿ s economic
activity (including self-employment). Fourth, the ENE captures and distinguishes between
formal and informal employment and ￿rms. Fifth, the panel structure of the ENE allows me
to investigate who is a⁄ected by the reform.
It is important to point out that the way the ENE sample is constructed implies that a
municipality-year average is not necessarily representative of the municipality in that year.
The sample selection procedure randomly selects households at a geographic unit, the AGEB
(Basic Geo-Statistical Area), that is smaller than the municipalities in my sample. All AGEBs
within a state are ￿rst strati￿ed by socioeconomic characteristics. Within each strata, a certain
number of AGEBs is chosen at random. Then, households are chosen at random within the
AGEB. This procedure implies that it could happen that only some socioeconomic groups get
selected in a given municipality in a given year. However, since the strata are randomly chosen,
this remains in expectation a random sample of the households in a municipality, so that the
estimate should remain unbiased. Moreover, the survey includes several di⁄erent strata for
most of the municipalities in my sample.
An alternative to using ENE data would have been to use administrative data from business
registries. This data is, however, not readily available for Mexico since municipalities do not
follow a uni￿ed system of recording registered ￿rms. Many records are paper records held only
at the local registry and are not publicly available. Moreover, some municipalities updated to
an electronic system after the reform, suggesting that the reform also impacted record keeping,
which may make pre- and post-reform records incomparable. Finally, unlike the ENE, registry
data would not include pre-registration information on ￿rms, such as whether they existed in
the informal sector.
Since I am looking at labor market outcomes, I keep only individuals of working age (be-
tween the ages of 20 and 65) in my sample. I construct three of my main outcome variables
by creating dummy variables for each person in the sample, which indicate whether the person
a) is employed, b) is a wage earner, and c) owns a registered business12. The later dummies
encompass subcategories of the earlier dummies, in the sense that everybody who is employed
can either be a wage earner or a business owner (I include the self-employed in the category
business owners). Business owners can either be registered or unregistered. However, since all
dummies are de￿ned for the whole sample, they denote the fraction of all individuals in my
12The Appendix includes a description of how I constructed these dummy variables, paying particular attention
to the way business registration is measured in the ENE and explaining some caveats.
15sample who fall into each category, not the fraction of people in the preceding category who fall
into each subcategory. For example, a value of 0.08 of the registered business owner dummy
means that 8 percent of all people own and operate a registered business, not 8 percent of
employed individuals.
I create six more dummy variables which split up the employed dummy, the wage earner
dummy, and the registered business dummy into low-risk and high-risk registered businesses,
using the industry information provided in the ENE and matching it to the low-risk and high-
risk/regulated industries as speci￿ed by COFEMER. Finally, I also use monthly income as an
outcome variable. While the dummy variables are de￿ned for everybody in my sample, income
is available only for the gainfully employed and is missing for the unemployed, for individuals
who are out of the labor force, and for unpaid workers.
The upper panel of Table 4a includes summary statistics for the outcome variables split up
by early and late adopter municipalities, where these groups are de￿ned as in Table 3 with early
(late) adopters adopting the reform between May 2002 (April 2004) and March 2004 (December
2004). The data in Table 4a are for the pre-reform period, including only observations between
2000-II and 2001-IV. The averages in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4a show that 66 percent of the
people in my sample are employed13. Individuals who are employed fall into three categories
- wage earners (who make up 50 percent of the population), registered business owners (8.4
percent) and non-registered business owners (7.9 percent). Most registered business owners
are in low-risk/unregulated industries (7.3 percent), with only 1.1 percent of the population
owning registered high-risk/regulated businesses.
The third column of Table 4a reports the di⁄erences in pre-reform averages for early and
late adopters. The di⁄erences are small and not statistically signi￿cant, except for log monthly
income. Income is 17.7 percent higher in early adopter municipalities. However, as Column 4
of Table 4a shows, none of the outcome variables are systematically increasing or decreasing
in the quarter of implementation.
As explained above, the required assumption for my estimations to be valid is that the
changes of the outcome variables would not have di⁄ered systematically between treatment
and control municipalities during the treatment period if the reform had not occurred. While
this assumption is fundamentally untestable, it is likely to hold if there are no initial systematic
di⁄erences in trends. To verify this, I report pre-period changes in outcome variables in Table
4b. The changes are calculated as 2000-IV to 2001-IV changes in municipality averages for each
13Labor force participation is about 68 percent. The unemployment rate is at a low 2 percent. Measured
unemployment tends to be low in Mexico since individuals count as employed even if they worked only one hour
during the past week. There is also a very small fraction of people who I count as being in the labor force who
are neither currenlty employed, nor unemployed, but who have a job lined up that they are planning to start
within the next month.
16variable. Most average changes in outcome variables are not statistically di⁄erent between early
and late adopter municipalities. They are also not signi￿cantly correlated with the quarter
of implementation, suggesting that the identi￿cation strategy is valid. The one exception is
the average change in employment. Municipalities that adopted earlier appear to have smaller
increases in overall employment. This would bias the analysis against ￿nding an e⁄ect of the
reform on overall employment.
I also use a number of individual background variables from the ENE as control variables
in my regression. These variables include age, gender, marital status, and education dummies.
Summary statistics for these background variables and their pre-period changes are listed in
the lower panels of Table 4a and 4b. The background variables are very similar across early
and late adopter municipalities. The only statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence in Table 4a is in the
fraction of females, where early adopter municipalities have about one percent fewer females.
6 Results
In this section, I put to test the predictions of the model developed above and analyze the
e⁄ects of the reform on average labor market outcomes. I also break down these e⁄ects by
pre-reform occupation and examine the impact of the reform on prices.
According to the identi￿cation strategy described in Section 4, I obtain the main results
by running the following regression with OLS
yict = ￿ + ￿c + ￿t + ￿SAREct + ￿Zict + ￿EC1999 ￿ t + "ict,
where the subscript i denotes individuals, c denotes municipalities, and t denotes quarters. This
regression includes municipality ￿xed e⁄ects, ￿c, and quarter ￿xed e⁄ects, ￿t. The variable
SAREct is the reform dummy and, for each municipality, it is equal to one for the quarter in
which the reform was implemented and for all following quarters. I run the regression without
and with the individual background variables, Zict. When including individual background
variables, I also include variables from the 1999 Economic Census (EC1999) interacted with
a linear time trend, t. These variables are log GDP per capita, log number of economic
establishments per 1000 capita, log ￿xed assets per capita, and log investment per capita14.
Note that I do not include individual dummies or time trends interacted with municipality
dummies in my regressions since they take out a lot of the variation in the reform dummy.
The standard errors of the regressions are clustered at the municipality level. As explained
in Bertrand, Du￿ o, and Mullainathan (2004), clustering at the region level helps to prevent
the problem that di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimates which use a large number of time periods
14The economic variables are converted to per capita levels using 2000 Demographic Census population data.
17severely understate uncorrected standard errors if the outcomes are serially correlated.
6.1 Registration
The ￿rst prediction of the model above is that the fraction of registered businesses should
increase after the reform. Table 5 contains the regressions for the registered business dummy,
which denotes the fraction of all people who own a registered business. Both, the speci￿cation
without controls and the one with individual level and Economic Census controls, show a
positive and signi￿cant impact of the reform on the number of registered businesses. The
increase of 0.32 percentage points is equal to a 3.8 percent increase in registered businesses
from the pre-reform level of 8.3 percent.
Columns 3 to 6 of Table 5 show the impact on registered businesses broken down by low-
risk and high-risk businesses. Since only the low-risk businesses are eligible for the reform, the
increase in registered businesses should only come from low-risk businesses. This is indeed what
the results in Columns 3 to 6 con￿rm. The fraction of low-risk registered businesses increased
by 0.37 percentage points (a increase of 5 percent from the pre-reform level of 7.4 percent),
while there was no statistically signi￿cant change in high-risk registered businesses. Based on
the fact that the 34 municipalities in my sample had a total population of 8,285,900 between
ages 20 and 65, according to the 2000 Demographic Census, an increase of 0.37 percentage
points in low-risk registered businesses corresponds to an increase in 30,678 ￿rms for all 34
municipalities or 902 ￿rms per municipality, on average. The total increase in the number of
formal ￿rms is 7.6 times bigger than the increase in formal ￿rms found in Kaplan, Piedra, and
Seira (2006), who estimate only 4,029 new formal ￿rms. As explained above, this big di⁄erence
may be due to the fact that Kaplan, Piedra, and Seira use registration data from the Mexican
Social Security Institute (IMSS), which implies that their estimates don￿ t capture ￿rms that
have no employees. They do also do not capture ￿rms that obtain an operating license but do
not register their workers with the IMSS.
The regression above estimates only the average e⁄ect of the reform on registration over
the post-treatment period. However, it is also important to check how this e⁄ect looks over
time. Figures 7 shows a plot of the coe¢ cients of the following regression
yict = ￿ + ￿c + ￿t +
X
￿lQuarterlc + ￿Zict + "ict,
where Quarterl is a set of dummy variables for lag and lead quarters relative to the time of
implementation in a given municipality. For example, Quarter￿1 is equal to one for the last
quarter before the reform was implemented. Since the implementation of the reform was phased
in over time and since the data set overs quarters 2000-II to 2004-IV only, I do not observe the
18outcome data for all lags and leads for all municipalities. For instance, the data set includes
information on Quarter+5 only for the eight municipalities that implemented the reform in
2003 or earlier. For Quarter+6 the data cover only six municipalities, and for Quarter+7 and
higher only two municipalities. Similarly, for the lags, the data cover all municipalities only for
Quarter￿8 and higher. For this reason, I limit the regression above to observations that fall
between Quarter￿8 and Quarter+6. Quarter￿8 is also the omitted quarter in the regression,
to which all other quarters are being compared.
Figure 7 shows the coe¢ cients on the lag and lead dummies for the regression with the low-
risk registered business owner dummy as the outcome variable. The two lighter colored lines
are the 95 percent con￿dence bands of the estimates. Between Quarter￿8 and Quarter￿1, the
estimated di⁄erences tend to be negative or close to zero. After implementation of the reform,
the di⁄erences become positive, re￿ ecting the increase in registration. The only exception to
the positive di⁄erences after implementation is Quarter+5. As mentioned above, the data set
covers fewer municipalities for this lead quarter than for previous lead quarters. The decrease
in registration may thus be driven by missing data rather than by a actually reversal of the
e⁄ect of the reform. Note that the coe¢ cient is much greater for Quarter+4 than for other
post-reform quarters. To make sure that the result in the regression in Column 4 of Table 5
is not only driven by Quarter+4, I rerun the regression without Quarter+4. The coe¢ cient
drops slightly from 0.0037 to 0.0034, and it is signi￿cant at the 5 percent level.
To check whether the measured increase of 0.37 percentage points in low-risk registered
businesses from Table 5 seems plausible, I use the 2004 administrative data from the business
registration center in Guadalajara. First, I calculate how many new businesses the increase
of 0.37 percentage points implies for Guadalajara. Given that Guadalajara had a population
between the ages of 20 and 65 of 879,019 in 2000, and assuming that the number of additional
businesses which came into being due to the reform was equal to the average 0.37 percentage
points, this implies that 3,252 new businesses in Guadalajara were created due to the reform.
Then, I compare 3,252 to the total number of licenses issued by the registration center in
Guadalajara. The center issued 16,613 new licenses in 2004. Given that the reform was
implemented in Guadalajara in May 2003, 16,613 is a lower-bound for the total number of
businesses created since the reform was implemented. The regression results thus suggest that
most of the new licenses issued since the reform in Guadalajara (13361 and up) would have
been issued in the absence of the reform as part of the normal turnover in businesses, and that
3,252 of them were issued as a result of the reform.
As mentioned in Section 2, for some municipalities, the COFEMER reports statistics on pre-
reform and post-reform registration procedures. These data are available for 27 municipalities
19in my sample, and I use it to test whether the e⁄ect on registration and income is greater in
municipalities with greater reductions in registration procedures. This test corresponds to the
following regression
yict = ￿ + ￿c + ￿t + ￿SAREct + ￿SAREct ￿ (￿Procedures)c + ￿Zict + ￿EC1999 ￿ t + "ict,
where ￿Procedures is the reduction in the number of procedures in municipality c. Con-
ditional on having the reform, the average reduction in the number of procedures was 5, with
a standard deviation of 6. The minimum was 0 and the maximum 2215. Column 1 of Table 6
shows the regression results for the registration dummy, where the regression includes individ-
ual background variables and Economic Census variables interacted with a linear time trend.
As expected, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term of the reform and reduction in procedures
is positive and signi￿cant, implying that the reform had a bigger e⁄ect on registration in mu-
nicipalities that saw a higher reduction in procedures. For a municipality with the average
reduction in procedures (5), the increase in registration was 1.4 percent.
The model from Section 3 predicts that the reform should a⁄ect individuals in di⁄erent
pre-reform occupations di⁄erently. To test these predictions, I make use of the panel structure
of my data. For each individual, I create four dummy variables that specify which of four
occupations they held when I ￿rst observed them in the pre-reform period. The four possible
occupations are registered business owner, non-registered business owner, wage earner, and
not employed (unemployed or out of the labor force)16. For example, for somebody who was a
wage earner in the ￿rst period when I observed her, the ￿past wage earner￿dummy is equal to
one. I then drop the ￿rst period of observation for each person and run the following regression
for the remaining periods
yioct = ￿ + ￿c + ￿t + PastOccupo + ￿c ￿ PastOccupo + ￿t ￿ PastOccupo
+￿SAREct ￿ PastOccupo + ￿Zioct + ￿EC1999 ￿ t + "ioct,
which includes the reform dummy interacted with all ￿ve past occupation dummies. The
regression also includes quarter, municipality and past occupation dummies, PastOccupo, as
well as the interactions of quarter with occupation dummies and time with occupation dum-
15The minimum of 0 only applies to three counties. In these counties, the number of procedures was already
low pre-reform. However, the reform was still e⁄ective in these counties since it reduced the number of days it
takes to register a business in all three counties. In two of the counties the reform also reduced the number of
o¢ ce visits.
16In the category "not employed", I also include the small fration of people who say that they are not currently
working, but have a job lined up that they are planning to start within one month.
20mies. Finally, it includes the set of individual background characteristics, Zioct, and Economic
Census variables, EC1999; interacted with a linear time trend. Individuals who are never ob-
served in the pre-reform period are dropped from this analysis, which makes the sample smaller
than the one used to determine the main e⁄ects above.
Panel A of Table 7 presents the regression results for this analysis. Column 1 shows that
past informal business owners are no more likely to register their businesses after the reform.
The e⁄ect on past wage earners, on the other hand, is positive and statistically signi￿cant at
the 15.9 percent level. The coe¢ cient may not be more statistically signi￿cant, because, as
explained in the previous paragraph, the sample is smaller, lowering power.
Panel B of Table 7 shows the e⁄ect on past wage earners, split up by whether they were
low-risk or high-risk wage earners. The e⁄ect is greater for low-risk wage earners, indicating
that individuals who started a low-risk business after the reform were mostly working in low-
risk sectors before the reform. Overall, the ￿ndings in Column 1 of Table 7 are consistent with
the assumption of low productivity of the informal sector in the model in Section 3, and they
are inconsistent with the high productivity assumption. The results thus suggests that the
low-ability (residual sector) view of informal business owners is more appropriate than the De
Soto view.
The model with the low productivity assumption also predicts that the wage earners who
open a registered business should be the ones with the highest ability levels 17. To test this, I
would need an estimate of their ability. Unfortunately, the dataset does not include any good
proxies for wage earners￿ability. The only characteristic in the dataset that is speci￿c to wage
earners is whether a wage earner has a written contract or not. About 67.4 percent of wage
earners had a written contract in the pre-reform period. In order to examine the e⁄ect on
wage earners in more detail, Table 8 shows the e⁄ect broken down by past wage earners who
had a written contract and who did not. The e⁄ect is four times bigger for wage earners who
did not have a written contract and is statistically signi￿cant for this group.
Table 9 examines the e⁄ect on di⁄erent groups of non-registered business owners. For non-
registered business owners, the data include information on the number of employees in the
￿rm. This variable is a possible proxy for entrepreneurial ability. Although 79.6 percent of
informal business owners work alone, some do have employees or partners, and the ones who
do may be the higher ability owners. Panel A of Table 9 reports the e⁄ect on non-registered
business owners who work alone and on non-registered business owners who have either partners
or employees in the business. The coe¢ cients are highly statistically insigni￿cant for both
17A limitation of the model and its predictions is that they are based on the quite restrictive assumption that
the ability relevant for wage work is the same as the ability relevant for opening a business. In future work, it
would be interesting to estimate a full Roy model of occupational choice to determine whether the people who
open a business are the ones with the highest return to opening a business.
21groups, implying that none of these groups is more likely to register after the reform. Panel
B of Table 9 illustrates that non-registered business owners who operate on ￿xed premises
(representing only 4 percent of informal business owners), as opposed to conducting their
business in mobile stands or going door-to-door, are also not more likely to register their
businesses after the reform.
6.2 Employment
The model from Section 3 also predicts that the reform leads to an increase in the number of
wage earners. Table 10 reports the regression for the wage earner dummy. Columns 3 and 4
show that the fraction of wage earners increased in low-risk (eligible) industries. This increase
in the fraction of wage earners of 0.64 percentage points corresponds to an increase of about
2 percent over the pre-reform fraction of low-risk wage earners. Dividing the increase in the
fraction of wage earners (0.64) by the increase in ￿rms (0.37) gives an average ￿rm size of
about 1.7 for newly created ￿rms. This number is much smaller than the average size of new
￿rms calculated in Kaplan, Piedra, and Seira (2006), which is 6.3. Since larger ￿rms may be
more likely to register their workers with the IMSS, it is perhaps not surprising that Kaplan,
Piedra, and Seira capture larger newly created ￿rms on average.
In the model, overall employment in the formal sector also increases since more agents
become formal business owners and wage earners. Table 11 examines the impact of the reform
on employment. Employment in low-risk industries went up by 1.24 percentage points, which
corresponds to a 2.8 percent increase over the pre-reform low-risk employment level.
Figures 8 and 9 show the e⁄ect on wage work and employment in low-risk industries broken
down by lag and lead quarters relative to the quarter of implementation. These ￿gures were
constructed using the same methodology as for Figure 7. The changes in the fraction of wage
earners and employment are close to zero until the quarter of implementation. From Quarter0
or Quarter1 on, both variables are signi￿cantly and increasingly higher than before.
Similarly to the fraction of registered businesses, the fraction of wage earners and employ-
ment in low-risk industries increased more in municipalities where the reduction in registration
procedures was greater, as shown in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 6. In a municipality with the
average reduction in procedures (5), the fraction of wage earners increased by 1.2 percent and
employment increased by 1.1 percent.
In the model, the increase in wage earners comes from informal business owners. Column
2 in Panel A of Table 7 breaks down the e⁄ect on the fraction of wage earners in low-risk
industries by pre-reform occupation type. The results show that instead of informal business
owners, it was mainly individuals who were previously not employed (the unemployed or out of
the labor force) who switched to being low-risk wage earners after the reform. The model could
22not have predicted this e⁄ect since all agents in the model are employed. In the data, however,
about 32 percent of the individuals do not participate in the labor force or are unemployed.
The model in this paper is kept simple to emphasize what the reform in Mexico can say about
the di⁄ering views of informal business owners. In order to capture more of the e⁄ects of the
reform, the model would have to be more complex. Agents who are not employed could, for
example, be introduced into the model if agents had di⁄erent costs of participating in the labor
market.
Another extension of the model for future work is the inclusion of non-eligible industries.
In the model, the entire formal business sector is subject to the reform. However, as Tables
10 and 11 show, the overall fraction of wage earners and overall employment did not increase
signi￿cantly. Instead the increase in wage earners and employment in low-risk (eligible) indus-
tries went along with a decrease in wage earners and employment in high-risk (non-eligible)
industries. Column 3 in Panel B of Table 7 illustrates that the decrease in wage earners in
high-risk industries is due the to fact that former high-risk wage earners are less likely to con-
tinue working in these industries after the reform. Instead, they move into low-risk industries,
as shown in Column 2. The coe¢ cients in Columns 2 and 3 in Panel A further suggest that
all past occupation groups are less likely to be high-risk wage earners after the reform and are
more likely to be low-risk wage earners instead. In order to interpret these e⁄ects, it is im-
portant to point out that the Mexican labor market is quite mobile, with large and symmetric
￿ ows among sectors and occupations (Maloney 1997). The reforms seems to have redirected
some of these ￿ ows from high-risk sectors to low-risk sectors.
6.3 Prices
The model above predicts that entry of new registered businesses after the reform decreases
prices. My measure of the price level is the Mexican consumer price index (CPI), which is
constructed by the Bank of Mexico. Price data are only available at the city level, not at the
municipality level. In Mexico, a city can consist of one or several municipalities. I thus convert
the price data to the municipality level by assigning each municipality the price index of the
city where it is located18. CPI data exists only for 20 out of 34 municipalities in the sample
since the other 14 municipalities do not fall into cities for which the CPI is calculated. As
opposed to the ENE data, which have a quarterly frequency, the price data come at a monthly
frequency. The speci￿cation used to analyze the e⁄ect on the price level is thus
log(CPIcm) = ￿ + ￿c + ￿m + ￿SAREcm + ￿EC1999 ￿ t + "cm,
18In my sample, only three counties lie in the same city (Guadalajara, Zapopan and Tlaquepaque in Guadala-
jara). These three counties are thus assigned the same price data. All other counties have unique observations.
23where the CPI varies by municipality and month and the subscript m stand for months. The
base month for the CPI is June 2002.
Table 12 presents the results for the price regression, for two di⁄erent time spans. Both
regressions include the same set of municipalities, which are only the municipalities that are
in the ENE sample. Column 1 of Table 12 corresponds to the time span for which I have
ENE data. As predicted by the model above, the coe¢ cient on the reform dummy is negative.
In the regression in Column 2, the time period covered goes up to May 2006, which is the
last month for which I have the CPI data. The negative coe¢ cient on the reform dummy is
similar in magnitude and is statistically signi￿cant in this larger sample. The decrease in the
consumer price level after the reform con￿rms the argument that lowering barriers to entry
bene￿ts consumers.
The coe¢ cients in Table 12 indicate that the reform decreased the log price level by ap-
proximately 0.6 percent. To get a sense of the magnitude of the e⁄ect, I compare it to the
average in￿ ation rate from 2000 to 2001. This average in￿ ation rate, calculated as the increase
in the CPI from each month in 2000 to the same month in 2001, was 5.7 percent. The decrease
in the log CPI of approximately 0.6 percent due to the reform is a decrease in in￿ ation of
approximately 0.6 percent. A back-of-the-envelope calculation thus suggests that the reform
decreased in￿ ation to about 5.1 percent from 5.7 percent.
If the decline in prices is indeed due to the reform, then the decline should be present only
in industries that are eligible for the reform (low-risk industries). Moreover, the measured
decline in prices should come entirely from the non-tradables sector. This is because the
estimation strategy compares prices across municipalities. The prices of non-tradables may
decrease locally, but the price of tradables should not be a⁄ected by an increase in the supply
in some municipalities only19. Table 13 breaks down the CPI into tradables and non-tradables,
by low-risk and high-risk industries. The results indeed show that prices declined signi￿cantly
only for non-tradables in low-risk industries.
6.4 Income
The regression results for the last ENE outcome variable, monthly income, are reported in
Table 14. This table displays the e⁄ect on log income by past occupation group. The model
predicts that the reform should decrease the income of incumbent registered business owners.
The results in Column 1 indeed show that nominal income decreased for past registered business
owners, by 3.2 percent. Given that the reform led to a decrease in the price level, it is also
important to examine the impact of the reform on real income, in order to check whether the
19Even if these counties were big enough to cause the price of tradables to change, no-arbitrage would imply
that there should not be any relative price di⁄erence for tradables across counties.
24decrease in income is solely due to the price e⁄ect. Column 3 of Table 14 examines the e⁄ect
on real income by past occupation group. As mentioned above, for real income, the analysis is
restricted to a smaller sample since the CPI is only available for 20 of the 34 municipalities in
my main sample20. Column 3 of Table 14 thus reports the e⁄ect on real income in the small
sample. Although the e⁄ect on the real income of incumbent registered business owners is
slightly smaller than the e⁄ect on their nominal income, it is statistically signi￿cant.
The model also predicts that the income of informal business owners goes down after the
reform. The regressions in Table 14, however, show no statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on the
income of informal business owners. It may be that informal business owners are not a⁄ected
by the decline in prices in the same way as formal business owners because the goods they are
producing are di⁄erentiated from formal sector goods.
The results for the e⁄ect on employment in Subsection 6.2 indicate that the previously
unemployed or out of the labor force were more likely to work as wage earners after the
reform. These switchers should thus also have seen a increase in their income. When aiming
to measure this increase, I cannot use log income as the outcome variable as is done in Table
14. Individuals who were initially unemployed or out of the labor force have zero income
and thus have to be dropped from a log regression. I choose two di⁄erent ways of including
the zero income observations, which are reported in Table 15. First, Columns 1 through 3
display regressions where the outcome variable is the quadratic root of income. The quadratic
root mimics the logarithmic function well for positive numbers. (See Thomas et al, 2003, who
choose the quadratic root of income instead of log to include zero and negative yields). Second,
Columns 5 through 6 of Table 15 report Tobit regressions. For the Tobit regressions, log(0)
observations are replaced with the smallest observed log income in the data. This value is then
used as the lower bound for the Tobit. The quadratic root and the Tobit regressions show
a signi￿cant increase in the income of the previously not employed. Nominal income for this
group increased by approximately 6 percent.
The regressions in Table 14 and 15 show either no e⁄ect or a negative and signi￿cant e⁄ect
on the average income of previous wage earners. The wage earners who opened registered
businesses, however, should be earning more. There are several possible explanations for the
zero or negative e⁄ect. First, wage earners who opened a business may still be paying o⁄
the ￿xed cost of their new business during the period of observation. When analyzing the
e⁄ect on the income of past wage earners, the regressions include a maximum of four quarters
after the reform was implemented. This is due to the fact that the labor market survey keeps
20The second column of Table 12 contains the same nominal income regression as Column 1, but for the
smaller sample. The comparison between Columns 1 and 2 illustrates that the e⁄ect on nominal income across
samples is very similar for all past occupation groups.
25individuals only for ￿ve quarters. Since the methodology requires one pre-reform period to
de￿ne pre-reform occupation status, post-reform observations exist for at most four quarters.
Second, wage earners who opened businesses may now understate their income (if they think
that the statistical institute communicates information to the tax o¢ ce, which to my knowledge
they do not). Third, business owners may have passed on some of the decline in prices to the
workers who did not open a new business but remained workers instead, lowering the average
income of past wage earners.
Tables 14 and 15 have illustrated the e⁄ect on the income of di⁄erent pre-reform occupation
groups. Table 16 displays the e⁄ect of the reform on average income. The ￿rst column uses
log income as the outcome variable. Panel A shows that the reform decreased nominal income
by 1.8 percent on average. Panel B reports the nominal income regression for the smaller
sample of municipalities for which price data is available, and Panel C reports real income
regressions. The e⁄ect on log income is negative and signi￿cant in all three panels. These
regressions thus pick up the e⁄ect of the decrease in income for incumbent registered business
owners. However, the log regressions in Column 1 exclude zero incomes and may therefore be
misspeci￿ed. Similarly to the regressions in Table 16, the regressions in Columns 2 and 3 of
Table 16 aim at resolving this problem by using the quadratic root of income as an outcome
variable and by running a Tobit. The quadratic root regressions no statistically signi￿cant
change in average income. The Tobit regression in Panel A indicates a positive e⁄ect on
average income (a 3.1 percent increase). The di⁄erence to the log income regressions comes
from the fact that, in addition to picking up the decline in income for incumbent formal
business owners and for some wage earners, the quadratic root and Tobit regressions pick up
the increase in income for the previously not employed.
Finally, Column 4 of Table 16 presents another way of including zero income observations
in the regression by looking at log aggregate municipality income per capita as the outcome
variable. Aggregate municipality income per capita was constructed by summing up all income
observations for a given municipality in a given quarter and then dividing by the number of
people observed in that quarter. The aggregate income regression for the whole sample shows a
negative but insigni￿cant e⁄ect on income. In the regressions for the smaller sample, however,
the e⁄ect is negative and signi￿cant.
Overall, the regressions do not show a robust e⁄ect on average income. They are, however,
more informative on the income e⁄ects of the reform on di⁄erent occupation groups. Incumbent
business owners saw a decline in income (due to increased competition). The previously not
employed, on the other hand, bene￿tted from the reform since some of them found jobs,
providing them with positive income.
267 Conclusion
This paper uses microeconomic data to analyze the e⁄ects of a business registration reform in
Mexico on registration, employment, prices, and income. It also traces out the e⁄ects of the
reform on di⁄erent pre-reform occupation groups, thereby o⁄ering an insight into the channels
through which the e⁄ects operate.
First, the paper provides evidence that simplifying entry regulation increases the number
of registered businesses. After the business registration reform in Mexico, the total number
of registered businesses increased by 5 percent in eligible industries. This ￿nding is in line
with previous cross-country studies which show that countries with simpler regulation have
more business entry. The paper then illustrates that the increase in registered businesses was
due to former wage workers opening businesses, and not due to unregistered business owners
registering their businesses. This e⁄ect is consistent with a model where unregistered business
owners are low-ability individuals in a residual sector. The evidence does no support models
that are in line with Hernando De Soto￿ s view that informal business owners are medium-range
ability individuals who choose a small scale production technology over wage work and who
cannot register since registration is too costly and complicated.
The fact that I do not ￿nd informal business owners registering their businesses after the
reform could also imply that complexity of business registration is not the relevant constraint
keeping ￿rms informal. After a ￿rm is registered, it is presumably under more pressure to pay
taxes and to comply with labor regulation (even though compliance is far from universal in
Mexico, even for registered ￿rms). The associated costs could be so big that changing only
registration procedures may not be enough to push informal businesses over the threshold to
formality.
This paper also shows that employment in eligible industries increased by 2.8 percent after
the reform. In particular, those previously unemployed and out of the labor force were more
likely to work as wage earners after the reform as the number of businesses increased. This
e⁄ect mirrors the cross-country results on output growth, where less complicated regulation is
associated with higher growth in output. It also provides evidence that lowering barriers to
entry bene￿ts consumers. Another piece of evidence suggesting that consumers bene￿t from
the reform is that prices decreased by 0.6 percent after the reform in Mexico. I attribute this to
the fact that new entrants increase total output in a market with a downward sloping demand
curve. The price decline was concentrated among low-risk industries in the non-tradable goods
sector, which indicates that it was due to competition. The increased competition also decreases
income of incumbent ￿rms by 3.2 percent.
Interestingly, this paper does not ￿nd an increase in the income of wage earners who opened
27businesses. A possible explanation is that these new entrepreneurs were still paying o⁄ the
￿xed cost of opening a business during the time span covered in the data. This paper measures
only the short-term e⁄ects of the reform, covering 3 quarters on average. For future research,
it would be interesting to also measure the longer run e⁄ects, and in particular, to examine
what happens to the income of new entrepreneurs over several periods.
Overall, the results suggest that promoting simpli￿cation of entry regulation is an e⁄ective
policy for fostering entrepreneurial activity and for making consumers better o⁄ by increasing
employment opportunities and by lowering prices. The attention that business registration
reform has recently received from policy makers thus appears to be warranted.
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Note: The shaded area represents the quarters covered by the data in used in this study. The vertical line  




  33Figure 7 – Coefficients on Relative Quarter Dummies in 
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Figure 8 – Coefficients on Relative Quarter Dummies in 
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Figure 9 – Coefficients on Relative Quarter Dummies in 
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  34 
Average Std. Dev. Min Max
Pre-reform
Days 30.1 16.7 2 60
Procedures 7.9 7.0 1 27
Office visits 4.2 2.0 1 10
Post-reform
Days 1.4 0.6 1 3
Procedures 2.7 2.1 1 9
Office visits 1.0 0.2 1 2
Table 1: Local Business Registration Procedures in Mexico
Note: These data come from the COFEMER website and are based on 32 
municipalities from 17 different states. On top of these procedures, most firms 
need to comply with one or two federal procedures, which can often be done in the 













Avg. pre-reform income (in logs) 7.519 8.010 8.324
Avg. pre-reform income residual -0.276 0.015 0.189
















(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Levels 1999
Log GDP per capita (value added) 9.546 9.145 0.401* -0.1046**
(0.578) (0.707) (0.221) (0.039)
Log establishments per capita 3.509 3.438 0.071 -0.013
(0.436) (0.239) (0.121) (0.017)
Log fixed assets per capita 9.637 9.376 0.261 -0.0966**
(0.615) (0.924) (0.269) (0.046)
Log investment per capita 6.833 6.733 0.100 -0.080
(0.725) (1.042) (0.308) (0.049)
Panel B: Changes 1994 - 1999
Log GDP per capita (value added) 1.112 1.106 0.006 0.001
(0.232) (0.286) (0.089) (0.016)
Log establishments per capita 0.112 0.145 -0.033 0.010
(0.103) (0.094) (0.034) (0.006)
Log fixed assets per capita 0.783 1.053 -0.270 0.020
(0.669) (0.343) (0.182) (0.021)
Log investment per capita 0.827 1.123 -0.296 0.059
(0.754) (0.963) (0.297) (0.069)
Observations 17 17 34 34
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. I define early adopters as the municipalities which implemented the reform between 
May 2002 and March 2004. Late adopters are municipalities which adopted the reform between April 2004 and December 
2004, when my dataset ends. Economic data come from the 1994 and 1999 Economic Census and are converted to per 
capita levels using data from the 1995 Population Count and the 2000 Demographic Census. Establishments are measured 
per 1000 inhabitants. Changes are defined as [Y(1999)-Y(1994)]. Column 4 presents the coefficients of a separate 
regression for each variable or change on quarter of implementation. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Table 3: Municipality Characteristics Economic Census
 
 









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome Variables
Employed dummy 0.6617 0.6605 0.0012 0.0002
(0.4731) (0.4735) (0.0118) (0.0025)
Low-risk employed dummy 0.4463 0.4402 0.0062 0.0003
(0.4971) (0.4964) (0.0211) (0.004)
High-risk employed dummy 0.2154 0.2203 -0.0049 -0.0001
(0.4111) (0.4145) (0.0208) (0.0032)
Wage earner dummy 0.5014 0.4941 0.0074 -0.0021
(0.5000) (0.5000) (0.0119) (0.0024)
Low-risk wage earner dummy 0.2998 0.2869 0.0129 -0.0019
(0.4582) (0.4523) (0.0170) (0.0029)
High-risk wage earner dummy 0.2017 0.2072 -0.0055 -0.0002
(0.4012) (0.4053) (0.0207) (0.0032)
Registered business owner dummy 0.0842 0.0839 0.0003 0.0008
(0.2776) (0.2772) (0.0064) (0.0010)
Low-risk registered owner 0.0737 0.0734 0.0003 0.0007
(0.2612) (0.2608) (0.0058) (0.0010)
High-risk registered owner 0.0105 0.0105 0.0000 0.0001
(0.1019) (0.1019) (0.0019) (0.0002)
Log monthly income 8.0686 7.8917 0.1769** -0.0298
(0.7450) (0.8117) (0.0812) (0.0197)
Background Variables
Primary education dummy 0.2286 0.2265 0.0020 -0.0007
(0.4199) (0.4186) (0.0141) (0.0021)
Secondary education dummy 0.2287 0.2289 -0.0001 -0.0004
(0.4200) (0.4201) (0.0127) (0.0018)
High school education dummy 0.2416 0.2348 0.0067 -0.0025
(0.4280) (0.4239) (0.0167) (0.0024)
University education dummy 0.1475 0.1371 0.0104 -0.0017
(0.3546) (0.3440) (0.0148) (0.002)
Female dummy 0.5310 0.5432 -0.0121** 0.0018
(0.4990) (0.4981) (0.0052) (0.0014)
Age 36.9033 37.1139 -0.2106 0.0305
(11.9884) (12.0612) (0.1598) (0.0221)
Married dummy 0.6694 0.6848 -0.0154 0.0041**
(0.4704) (0.4646) (0.0108) (0.002)
Table 4a: Pre-Reform Averages of Individual Level Variables
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Data is from 2000 & 2001 ENE. The 
employed include wage earners and self-employed/business owners. Column 4 presents the coefficients of a 
separate regression for each variable on quarter of implementation. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%  









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome Variables
Employed change -0.0045 0.0148 -0.0193* 0.0046***
(0.0220) (0.0331) (0.0097) (0.0017)
Low-risk employed change 0.0047 0.0201 -0.0154 0.0035
(0.0236) (0.0452) (0.0124) (0.0022)
High-risk employed change -0.0092 -0.0053 -0.0040 0.0011
(0.0130) (0.0282) (0.0075) (0.0013)
Wage earner change -0.0082 0.0044 -0.0126 0.0022
(0.0170) (0.0279) (0.0079) (0.0016)
Low-risk wage earner change -0.0006 0.0100 -0.0106 0.0016
(0.0229) (0.0296) (0.0091) (0.0018)
High-risk wage earner change -0.0076 -0.0056 -0.0020 0.0005
(0.0140) (0.0289) (0.0078) (0.0014)
Registered business owner change 0.0016 0.0017 -0.0001 0.0005
(0.0145) (0.0124) (0.0046) (0.0007)
Low-risk registered owner change 0.0025 0.0014 0.0012 0.0001
(0.0147) (0.0105) (0.0044) (0.0008)
High-risk registered owner change -0.0010 0.0003 -0.0013 0.0004
(0.0047) (0.0035) (0.0014) (0.0003)
Log monthly income change 0.1044 0.1379 -0.0334 0.0057
(0.0455) (0.1034) (0.0274) (0.0046)
Background Variables
Primary education change 0.0029 -0.0102 0.0131** -0.0013
(0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0061) (0.0010)
Secondary education change 0.0086 0.0032 0.0053 -0.0013
(0.0217) (0.0166) (0.0066) (0.0012)
High school education change -0.0037 0.0144 -0.0181*** 0.0017
(0.0182) (0.0190) (0.0064) (0.0011)
University education change 0.0018 0.0023 -0.0005 0.0001
(0.0183) (0.0116) (0.0053) (0.0009)
Female change 0.0036 -0.0081 0.0117* -0.0029**
(0.0157) (0.0199) (0.0062) (0.0013)
Age change 0.3067 -0.0508 0.3575* -0.0244
(0.4665) (0.7032) (0.2047) (0.0453)
Married change -0.0069 -0.0049 -0.0020 0.0001
(0.0240) (0.0175) (0.0072) (0.0012)
Table 4b: Pre-Reform Yearly Changes in Individual Level Variables
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Changes are changes in ENE municipality averages from 2000-IV to 2001-IV. 
Column 4 presents the coefficients of a separate regression for each variable on quarter of implementation. 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%  
  38(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reform dummy (SARE) 0.0036** 0.0032** 0.0042*** 0.0037*** -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Primary education dummy 0.0314*** 0.0249*** 0.0065***
(0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0006)
Secondary education dummy 0.0475*** 0.0395*** 0.0081***
(0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0009)
High school education dummy 0.0556*** 0.0478*** 0.0078***
(0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0008)
University education dummy 0.1170*** 0.1124*** 0.0046***
(0.0067) (0.0063) (0.0011)
Female dummy -0.0829*** -0.0636*** -0.0193***
(0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0018)
Age 0.0031*** 0.0027*** 0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Married dummy 0.0257*** 0.0204*** 0.0053***
(0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0005)
Census variables*time trend No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.003 0.057 0.003 0.047 0.001 0.014
No. of observations 1,636,225 1,636,225 1,636,225 1,636,225 1,636,225 1,636,225
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Regressions include quarter and municipality fixed 
effects. Census variables are log GDP per capita, log number of economic establishments per 1000 capita, log fixed assets per 
capita, and log investment per capita from the 1999 Economic Census, converted to per capita levels using population data 
from the 2000 Demographic Census. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Dependent variable:




















Reform dummy (SARE) 0.0021 0.0006 0.0045
(0.0020) (0.0038) (0.0058)
Reform dummy*Reduct. in procedures 0.0002* 0.0007** 0.0010***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
R-squared 0.048 0.076 0.095
No. of observations 1,392,457 1,392,457 1,392,457
Table 6: Impact of Reform By Reduction in Number of Procedures
Dependent variable:
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Regressions include quarter and 
municipality fixed effects. They also include 1999 municipality ln GDP per capita, ln number of 
establishments per capita, ln fixed assets per capita, and ln investment per capita, all interacted with a linear 












Panel A: Impact on all groups
SARE*Past registered owner 0.0053 0.0104* -0.0043
(0.0086) (0.0057) (0.0061)
SARE*Past non-registered owner -0.0004 0.0031 -0.0062**
(0.0066) (0.0089) (0.0026)
SARE*Past wage earner 0.0021 0.0051 -0.0125**
(0.0014) (0.0045) (0.0049)
SARE*Past not employed 0.0000 0.0124*** -0.0022
(0.0017) (0.0028) (0.0028)
R-squared 0.347 0.198 0.252
No. of observations 1,051,274 1,051,274 1,051,274
Panel B: Impact on wage earners
SARE*Past low-risk wage earner 0.0026 -0.0013 -0.0057*
(0.0020) (0.0056) (0.0031)
SARE*Past high-risk wage earner 0.0016 0.0067** -0.0123**
(0.0015) (0.0032) (0.0059)
R-squared 0.018 0.400 0.595
No. of observations 520,804 520,804 520,804
Dependent variable:
Table 7: Impact of Reform by Pre-Reform Occupation
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Past occupation variables are pre-reform 
occupations when the person was first observed. The past not employed include the unemployed, people who are 
not in the labor force, and the small fraction of people who say that they are not currently working, but have a 
job lined up that they are planning to start within one month. Regressions include quarter and municipality fixed 
effects, as well as dummies for occupation interacted with quarter and municipality fixed effects, and individual 
background variables. They also include 1999 municipality log GDP per capita, log number of economic 
establishments per 1000 capita, log fixed assets per capita, and log investment per capita, all interacted with a 
linear time trend. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%  
 
 
  41Dependent variable:
Low-risk registered business 
owner dummy
Reform dummy*Wage earner has a written contract 0.0013
(0.0011)
Reform dummy*Wage earner has no written contract 0.0054*
(0.0029)
R-squared 0.022
No. of observations 520,804
Table 8: Impact on Wage Earners
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Sample includes past wage 
earners only. Written contract variables are pre-reform characteristics when the person was first 
observed. Regressions include quarter and municipality fixed effects, as well as dummies for firm 
characteristics interacted with quarter and municipality fixed effects, and individual background 
variables. They also include 1999 municipality log GDP per capita, log number of economic 
establishments per 1000 capita, log fixed assets per capita, and log investment per capita, all interacted 




Low-risk registered business 
owner dummy
Panle A: Impact by firm size
Reform dummy*Owner is alone in firm -0.0025
(0.0083)
Reform dummy*Owner is not alone (has partners and/or workers) 0.0050
(0.0439)
R-squared 0.044
No. of observations 85,691
Panel B: Impact by type of premises
Reform dummy*Fixed premises -0.0056
(0.0307)
Reform dummy*Mobile premises (street stand or door-to-door) -0.0036
(0.0067)
R-squared 0.062
No. of observations 78,518
Table 9: Impact on Non-Registered Business Owners
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Sample includes past non-registered business 
owners only. Firm size and type of premises variables are pre-reform characteristics when the person was first 
observed. Regressions include quarter and municipality fixed effects, as well as dummies for firm characteristics 
interacted with quarter and municipality fixed effects, and individual background variables. They also include 1999 
municipality log GDP per capita, log number of economic establishments per 1000 capita, log fixed assets per capita, 
and log investment per capita, all interacted with a linear time trend. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
 
  42(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reform dummy (SARE) -0.0020 -0.0006 0.0051 0.0064** -0.0071* -0.0070***
(0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0035) (0.0021)
Primary education dummy 0.0563*** 0.0034 0.0529***
(0.0040) (0.0032) (0.0041)
Secondary education dummy 0.1182*** -0.0096** 0.1278***
(0.0066) (0.0046) (0.0075)
High school education dummy 0.1006*** -0.0892*** 0.1898***
(0.0080) (0.0064) (0.0083)
University education dummy 0.2356*** -0.1395*** 0.3751***
(0.0112) (0.0087) (0.0151)
Female dummy -0.2509*** -0.1447*** -0.1062***
(0.0093) (0.0104) (0.0075)
Age -0.0047*** -0.0061*** 0.0013***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Married dummy -0.0808*** -0.0955*** 0.0147***
(0.0074) (0.0060) (0.0034)
Census variables*time trend No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.003 0.119 0.007 0.078 0.011 0.113
No. of observations 1,636,225 1,636,225 1,636,225 1,636,225 1,636,225 1,636,225
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Regressions include quarter and municipality 
fixed effects. Census variables are log GDP per capita, log number of economic establishments per 1000 capita, log 
fixed assets per capita, and log investment per capita from the 1999 Economic Census, converted to per capita levels 
using population data from the 2000 Demographic Census. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%








  43(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reform dummy (SARE) 0.0035 0.0049 0.011** 0.0124*** -0.0075** -0.0075***
(0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0045) (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0021)
Primary education dummy 0.0498*** -0.0090* 0.0588***
(0.0035) (0.0052) (0.0041)
Secondary education dummy 0.0916*** -0.0423*** 0.1339***
(0.0043) (0.0089) (0.0075)
High school education dummy 0.0578*** -0.1373*** 0.1951***
(0.0072) (0.0111) (0.0078)
University education dummy 0.2171*** -0.1586*** 0.3758***
(0.0061) (0.0151) (0.0147)
Female dummy -0.3958*** -0.2653*** -0.1305***
(0.0109) (0.0133) (0.0075)
Age -0.0002*** -0.0020*** 0.0018***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Married dummy -0.0578*** -0.0781*** 0.0203***
(0.0069) (0.0058) (0.0033)
Census variables*time trend No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.003 0.206 0.008 0.094 0.010 0.117
No. of observations 1,636,225 1,636,225 1,636,225 1,636,225 1,636,225 1,636,225
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Regressions include quarter and municipality fixed 
effects. Census variables are log GDP per capita, log number of economic establishments per 1000 capita, log fixed assets 
per capita, and log investment per capita from the 1999 Economic Census, converted to per capita levels using population 
data from the 2000 Demographic Census. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%











  44(1) (2)
Reform dummy (SARE) -0.0056 -0.0058**
(0.0043) (0.0027)
Time span  Apr 00 - Dec 04 Apr 00 - May 06
R-squared 0.980 0.983
No. of observations 1,140 1,480
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Regressions include 
month and municipality fixed effects, as well as 1999 municipality log GDP per capita, 
log number of economic establishments per 1000 capita, log fixed assets per capita, and 
log investment per capita, all interacted with a linear time trend. Regressions are for 20 
municipalities only since the price index is only available for 20 of the 34 municipalities in 
the main sample. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Dependent variable: Log consumer price index




Dependent variable: Log Price index for
Coefficient on reform 
dummy (SARE)
Non-tradables in low-risk industries -0.0096**
(0.0040)
Non-tradables in high-risk industries -0.0062
(0.0089)
Tradables in low-risk industries -0.0039
(0.0034)
Tradables in high-risk industries 0.0014
(0.0036)
Table 13: Impact of Reform on Prices by Subcategory
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Regressions 
include month and municipality fixed effects, as well as 1999 municipality log 
GDP per capita, log number of economic establishments per 1000 capita, log fixed 
assets per capita, and log investment per capita, all interacted with a linear time 
trend. Regressions are for 20 municipalities only since the price index is only 
available for 20 of the 34 municipalities in the main sample. Regressions are for 
the April 2000 to May 2006 time span and include 1,480 observations. 









SARE*Past registered owner -0.0317* -0.0387** -0.0353**
(0.0180) (0.0172) (0.0165)
SARE*Past non-regist. owner -0.0177 -0.0062 -0.0038
(0.0211) (0.0213) (0.0212)
SARE*Past wage earner -0.0047 -0.0065 -0.0035
(0.0082) (0.0074) (0.0082)
R-squared 0.376 0.382 0.376
No. of municipalities 34 20 20
No. of observations 570,154 419,709 419,709
Table 14: Impact on Income by Pre-Reform Occupation
Dependent variable:
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Past occupation 
variables are pre-reform occupations when the person was first observed. The 
regressions drop all individuals who were initially not employed since their past income 
is not observed. Regressions include quarter and municipality fixed effects, as well as 
dummies for firm characteristics interacted with quarter and municipality fixed effects, 
and individual background variables. They also include 1999 municipality log GDP per 
capita, log number of economic establishments per 1000 capita, log fixed assets per 
capita, and log investment per capita, all interacted with a linear time trend. Column 1 
includes all 34 municipalities from the main sample. Columns 2 and 3 include only the 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SARE*Past registered owner -0.0568 -0.0405 -0.0334 -0.0326 -0.0103 -0.0035
(0.0561) (0.0505) (0.0459) (0.0329) (0.0366) (0.0537)
SARE*Past non-regist. owner 0.0449 0.0506 0.0512 0.0405 0.0421 0.0595
(0.0570) (0.0471) (0.0479) (0.0339) (0.0380) (0.0563)
SARE*Past wage earner -0.0443 -0.0519** -0.0450* -0.0354*** -0.0371** -0.0368
(0.0271) (0.0238) (0.0229) (0.0138) (0.0154) (0.0227)
SARE*Past not employed 0.0656** 0.0548 0.0554 0.0571*** 0.0495*** 0.1508***
(0.0322) (0.0344) (0.0339) (0.0160) (0.0179) (0.0343)
R-squared 0.545 0.546 0.546 0.155 0.156 0.175
No. of counties 34 20 20 34 20 20
No. of observations 1,009,174 733,669 733,669 1,009,174 733,669 733,669
Table 15: Impact on Income by Pre-Reform Occupation
Dependent variable:
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Past occupation variables are pre-reform occupations 
when the person was first observed. The past not employed include the unemployed, people who are not in the labor force, and 
the small fraction of people who say that they are not currently working, but have a job lined up that they are planning to start 
within one month. Regressions include quarter and municipality fixed effects, as well as dummies for occupation interacted 
with quarter and municipality fixed effects and individual background variables. They also include 1999 municipality log GDP 
per capita, log number of economic establishments per 1000 capita, log fixed assets per capita, and log investment per capita, 
all interacted with a linear time trend. Columns 1 and 4 include all 34 municipalities from the main sample. Columns 2, 3, 5, 
and 6 include only the 20 municipalities for which the price index is available. In the Tobit regressions, log(0) observations are 
replaced with the value of the lowest log income in the data. This value is also used as the lower bound for the Tobit. 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%















(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Nominal income
Reform dummy (SARE) -0.0180* 0.0039 0.0309* -0.0167
(0.0090) (0.0338) (0.0181) (0.0230)
R-squared 0.355 0.288 0.060 0.932
No. of municipalities 34 34 34 34
No. of observations 974,146 1,565,720 1,565,720 645
Panel B: Nominal income
Reform dummy (SARE) -0.0200**  -0.0241 0.0015 -0.0454*
(0.0088) (0.0371) (0.0206) 0.0225
R-squared 0.360 0.282 0.058 0.921
No. of municipalities 20 20 20 20
No. of observations 731,302 1,165,522 1,165,522 380
Panel C: Real income
Reform dummy (SARE) -0.0169* -0.0165 -0.0027 -0.0426*
(0.0091) (0.0346) (0.0128) (0.0215)
R-squared 0.352 0.282 0.054 0.912
No. of municipalities 20 20 20 20
No. of observations 731,302 1,165,522 1,165,522 380
Table 16: Impact of Business Registration Reform on Income
Dependent variable: 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). Regressions include quarter and 
municipality fixed effects. They also include 1999 municipality ln GDP per capita, ln number of 
establishments per capita, ln fixed assets per capita, and ln investment per capita, all interacted with a 
linear time trend, as well as individual background variables. Panel A includes all 34 municipalities from 
my main sample. Panels B and C include only the 20 municipalities for which the price index is available. 
In the Tobit regressions, log(0) observations are replaced with the value of the lowest log income in the 








  48Appendix A. Examples of “Low-Risk to Society” and “High-Risk to Society”/Regulated Industries 
 
 
Low-Risk to Society Industries High-Risk to Society/Regulated Industries
Most agricultural acitivites Mineral extraction
Electricity, water, and gas
Food production Production of alcoholic beverages
Textile production Paper production









Real estate Financial services
Professional services
Hotels and restaurants  
 
  49Appendix B. Reform Municipalities by Implementation Date 
 
Municipality State Reform Date
Puebla Puebla 8-May-2002




Mexicali Baja California 2-Jun-2003
León Guanajuato 1-Jul-2003




















Jaral del Progreso Guanajuato 19-Oct-2004









Boca del Río Veracruz 16-Dec-2004
Shaded municipalities are not represented in the data set I am using.  
 
  50Appendix C. Definition of Variables 
 
Employed Dummy: The employed dummy is equal to one for everybody who  
1.  Worked for pay for a least one hour during the past week, or 
2.  Was on paid vacation, leave or on strike during the past week, or 
3.  Didn’t work during the past week for other reasons, but has a job and will return to work within one month, or 
4.  Helped somebody else without pay in their business. 
This and all other dummy variables are zero for everybody else in my sample, which are people between 20 and 65 years old. 
 
Wage Earner Dummy: This dummy is equal to one for people who 
1.  Are employed according to the definition above, and 
2.  Who chose the option of “worker” or “member of a cooperative” as the answer to the question about which position they held in 
their main job. 
 
Registered Business Dummy: This dummy is equal to one for people who 
1.  Are employed according to the definition above, and 
2.  Chose the option of “boss” or “self-employed” as the answer to the question about which position they held in their main job, and 
3.  Are classified into category 2 or 4 of the survey question “What is the name of your business?” The instructions to interviewers 
specify that the word “name” here refers to the legal name under which the business is registered with the authorities. After 
asking this question, the interviewer has to further classify the business into one of the following categories 1) state-owned 
company, 2) industrial, commercial or services chain, 3) cooperative or trade union, 4) any other economic entity with name 
and/or register, 5) business owner or self-employed whose business does not have any (legal) name and/or register, 6) worker in a 
business without (legal) name and/or register, 7) worker in the US. All “bosses” or “self-employed” in my sample have values 2, 
4, 5, or 7 for this question. I drop individuals with value 7. For category 4, the instructions tell the interviewer that any type of 
official register is sufficient, such as federal tax register, health ministry register, or municipal government register. Since the 
SARE reform simplifies obtaining a municipal license, I would ideally like to know whether the firm has a municipal register 
only. Firms need to register with the federal tax authority first before registering for a municipal license, implying that this 
measure may overstate the number of firms registered with the municipal government. Other types of registers, such as the health 
ministry register typically come after registration with the municipal authorities, meaning that these types of registers capture 
what is relevant for this study. An additional caveat is that the instructions also specify that anybody with a professional license 
who has an unregistered business should be classified as registered here. Note that neither tax registration nor professional 
licensing should change due to the reform (unless a businesses gets registered for taxes since the owner also wants to register it 
for a municipal license), meaning that the estimated effect of the reform on the number of registered businesses should only come 
from additional businesses with municipal licenses. 
 
Only 53 percent of people in my sample who comply with criteria 1 and 2 also comply with criterion 3. The others are self-employed 
without being registered. Most of these people are engaged in small commerce, food preparation, repair work or construction. They 
work roadside without a fixed locality, in the home of their clients, or in their own home. 
A concern is that people may not truthfully report whether their business is registered with the authorities. To check whether the 
fraction of individuals who report having a registered business seems reasonable, I compare the ENE number to the number of 
economic establishments per population of age 20-65, calculated from the 1999 Economic Census and the 2000 Demographic Census. 
For the 34 municipalities in my sample, the total number of establishments is 553,235 and the total population 20-65 is 8,285,900, 
implying a ratio of 0.067. This number is not far from the mean of the registered business dummy in my ENE sample (0.084). The 
Census number may be lower since the Economic Census only includes businesses that have a fixed establishment. While the majority 
of registered businesses fall into this category, there are also some who operate in vehicles (such as taxi drivers), who work from home 
or in the home of their clients. 
 
Low-Risk (High-Risk) Registered Businesses Dummy: The low-risk (high-risk) dummy is equal to one for individuals for whom the 
registered business dummy is equal to one and who are in a low-risk (high-risk) industry. Appendix B describes the division of 
industries into low-risk and high-risk. 
 
Income: This variable is the monthly income from the main job held in the past week. It is zero for the people who work without pay, 
who are unemployed, or who are out of the labor force. 
 
Schooling Dummies: These dummies refer to the highest completed level of schooling. 
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